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Resumo
Trata-se de um ensaio que compara a abordagem 
científica da análise e tomada de decisão sobre ris-
cos com a maneira como pessoas comuns percebem 
e respondem aos riscos. Aborda a importância da 
confiança como um determinante do risco percebido 
e descreve nova pesquisa sobre “risco como senti-
mentos”, o “Efeito Heurístico” e a relevância desse 
novo trabalho. O conceito de risco é extremamente 
complexo, pois, além dos fatores científicos, está 
intrinsecamente associado a elementos sociais e sua 
percepção. Os riscos envolvem muitas incertezas de 
difícil medição. Outra questão importante é a ampli-
ficação social do risco. A confiança é a palavra-chave 
para problemas de comunicação sobre o risco. A 
conclusão é feita ao redor do tema da racionalidade 
e irracionalidade humana face ao risco.
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Abstract
The essay contrasts the scientific approach to 
analyzing and making decisions about risk with 
the ways that ordinary people perceive and respond 
to risk. It highlights the importance of trust as a 
determiner of perceived risk. It describes relatively 
new research on “risk as feelings” and the “Affect 
Heuristic”. Finally reflects on the importance of 
this work for risk communication and concludes 
with some observations about human rationality 
and irrationality in the face of risk.
Keywords: Evaluation of Risk; Risk Perception; 
Human Judgment and Decision Making.
Introduction 
Ironically, as our society and other industrialized 
nations have expended great effort to make life safer 
and healthier, many in the public have become more, 
rather than less, concerned about risk. These indi-
viduals see themselves as exposed to more serious 
risks than were faced by people in the past, and they 
believe that this situation is getting worse rather 
than better. Nuclear and chemical technologies 
(except for medicines) have been stigmatized by 
being perceived as entailing unnaturally great risks 
(Gregory et al., 1995). As a result, it has been difficult, 
if not impossible, to find host sites for disposing of 
high-level or low-level radioactive wastes, or for inci-
nerators, landfills, and other chemical facilities.
Public perceptions of risk have been found to 
determine the priorities and legislative agendas of 
regulatory bodies such as the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, much to the distress of agency technical 
experts who argue that other hazards deserve higher 
priority. The bulk of EPA’s budget in recent years 
has gone to hazardous waste primarily because the 
public believes that the cleanup of Superfund sites 
is one of the most serious environmental priorities 
for the country. Hazards such as indoor air pollution 
are considered more serious health risks by experts 
but are not perceived that way by the public (United 
States, 1987).
Great disparities in monetary expenditures 
designed to prolong life, as shown by Tengs et al. 
(1995), may also be traced to public perceptions of 
risk. Such discrepancies are seen as irrational by 
many harsh critics of public perceptions. These 
critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the experts 
and the public. Experts are seen as purveying risk 
assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, 
wise, and rational—based on the real risks. In con-
trast, the public is seen to rely on perceptions of 
risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emo-
tional, foolish, and irrational (see, e.g. Covello et 
al., 1983; DuPont, 1980). Weiner (1993) defends this 
dichotomy, arguing that “This separation of reality 
and perception is pervasive in a technically sophis-
ticated society, and serves to achieve a necessary 
emotional distance . . .” (p. 495).
In sum, polarized views, controversy, and overt 
conflict have become pervasive within risk asses-
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sment and risk management. A desperate search 
for salvation through risk-communication efforts 
began in the mid-l980s—yet, despite some localized 
successes, this effort has not stemmed the major 
conflicts or reduced much of the dissatisfaction 
with risk management. This dissatisfaction can be 
traced, in part, to a failure to appreciate the complex 
and socially determined nature of the concept “risk.” 
In the remainder of this paper, I shall describe seve-
ral streams of research that demonstrate this com-
plexity and point toward the need for new definitions 
of risk and new approaches to risk management.
The Subjective and Value-Laden 
Nature of Risk Assessment
Attempts to manage risk must confront the ques-
tion: “What is risk?” The dominant conception 
views risk as “the chance of injury, damage, or loss” 
(Webster, 1983). The probabilities and consequences 
of adverse events are assumed to be produced by 
physical and natural processes in ways that can be 
objectively quantified by risk assessment. Much 
social science analysis rejects this notion, arguing 
instead that risk is inherently subjective (Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 1992; Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Otway, 
1992; Pidgeon et al., 1992; Slovic, 1992; Wynne, 
1992). In this view, risk does not exist “out there,” 
independent of our minds and cultures, waiting to 
be measured. Instead, human beings have invented 
the concept risk to help them understand and cope 
with the dangers and uncertainties of life. Although 
these dangers are real, there is no such thing as “real 
risk” or “objective risk.” The nuclear engineer’s pro-
babilistic risk estimate for a nuclear accident or the 
toxicologist’s quantitative estimate of a chemical’s 
carcinogenic risk are both based on theoretical mo-
dels, whose structure is subjective and assumption-
laden, and whose inputs are dependent on judgment. 
As we shall see, nonscientists have their own models, 
assumptions, and subjective assessment techniques 
(intuitive risk assessments), which are sometimes 
very different from the scientists’ models.
One way in which subjectivity permeates risk 
assessments is in the dependence of such assess-
ments on judgments at every stage of the process, 
from the initial structuring of a risk problem to 
deciding which endpoints or consequences to in-
clude in the analysis, identifying and estimating 
exposures, choosing dose-response relationships, 
and so on. For example, even the apparently simple 
task of choosing a risk measure for a well-defined 
endpoint such as human fatalities is surprisingly 
complex and judgmental. Table 1 shows a few of 
the many different ways that fatality risks can be 
measured. How should we decide which measure to 
use when planning a risk assessment, recognizing 
that the choice is likely to make a big difference in 
how the risk is perceived and evaluated?
Table 1 - Some Ways of Expressing Mortality Risks
Deaths per million people in the population
Deaths per million people within x miles of the source of exposure
Deaths per unit of concentration
Deaths per facility
Deaths per ton of air toxic released
Deaths per ton of air toxic absorbed by people
Deaths per ton of chemical produced
Deaths per million dollars of product produced
Loss of life expectancy associated with exposure to the hazard
An example taken from Crouch and Wilson 
(1982), demonstrates how the choice of one mea-
sure or another can make a technology look either 
more or less risky. For example, between 1950 and 
1970, coal mines became much less risky in terms 
of deaths from accidents per ton of coal, but they 
became marginally riskier in terms of deaths from 
accidents per employee. Which measure one thinks 
more appropriate for decision making depends on 
one’s point of view. From a national point of view, 
given that a certain amount of coal has to be obtai-
ned to provide fuel, deaths per million tons of coal is 
the more appropriate measure of risk, whereas from 
a labor leader’s point of view, deaths per thousand 
persons employed may be more relevant.
Each way of summarizing deaths embodies its 
own set of values (National Research Council, 1989). 
For example, “reduction in life expectancy” treats de-
aths of young people as more important than deaths 
of older people, who have less life expectancy to lose. 
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Simply counting fatalities treats deaths of the old 
and young as equivalent; it also treats as equivalent 
deaths that come immediately after mishaps and 
deaths that follow painful and debilitating disease. 
Using “number of deaths” as the summary indicator 
of risk implies that it is as important to prevent de-
aths of people who engage in an activity by choice 
and have been benefiting from that activity as it is 
to protect those who are exposed to a hazard invo-
luntarily and get no benefit from it. One can easily 
imagine a range of arguments to justify different 
kinds of unequal weightings for different kinds of 
deaths, but to arrive at any selection requires a value 
judgment concerning which deaths one considers 
most undesirable. To treat the deaths as equal also 
involves a value judgment.
The Multidimensionality of Risk
As will be shown in the next section, research has 
found that the public has a broad conception of 
risk, qualitative and complex, that incorporates 
considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastro-
phic potential, controllability, equity, risk to future 
generations, and so forth, into the risk equation 
(Slovic, 1987). In contrast, experts’ perceptions of 
risk are not closely related to these dimensions 
or the characteristics that underlie them. Instead, 
studies show that experts tend to see riskiness as 
synonymous with probability of harm or expected 
mortality, consistent with the ways that risks tend 
to be characterized in risk assessments (see, for 
example, Cohen, 1985). As a result of these different 
perspectives, many conflicts over “risk” may result 
from experts and laypeople having different defini-
tions of the concept. In this light, it is not surprising 
that expert recitations of “risk statistics” often do 
little to change people’s attitudes and perceptions.
There are legitimate, value-laden issues un-
derlying the multiple dimensions of public risk 
perceptions, and these values need to be considered 
in risk-policy decisions. For example, is risk from 
cancer (a dreaded disease) worse than risk from auto 
accidents (not dreaded)? Is a risk imposed on a child 
more serious than a known risk accepted voluntarily 
by an adult? Are the deaths of 50 passengers in sepa-
rate automobile accidents equivalent to the deaths 
of 50 passengers in one airplane crash? Is the risk 
from a polluted Superfund site worse if the site is 
located in a neighborhood that has a number of other 
hazardous facilities nearby? The difficult questions 
multiply when outcomes other than human health 
and safety are considered.
Studying Risk Perceptions: the psychometric 
paradigm
Just as the physical, chemical, and biological pro-
cesses that contribute to risk or reduce risk can be 
studied scientifically, so can the processes affecting 
risk perceptions.
One broad strategy for studying perceived risk is 
to develop a taxonomy for hazards that can be used 
to understand and predict responses to their risks. 
A taxonomic scheme might explain, for example, 
people’s extreme aversion to some hazards, their 
indifference to others, and the discrepancies be-
tween these reactions and experts’ opinions. The 
most common approach to this goal has employed 
the psychometric paradigm (Fischhoff et al., 1978; 
Slovic et al., 1984), which uses psychophysical sca-
ling and multivariate analysis techniques to produce 
quantitative representations of risk attitudes and 
perceptions. Within the psychometric paradigm, 
people make quantitative judgments about the 
current and desired riskiness of diverse hazards 
and the desired level of regulation of each. These 
judgments are then related to judgments about other 
properties, such as (i) the hazard’s status on charac-
teristics that have been hypothesized to account for 
risk perceptions and attitudes (for example, volun-
tariness, dread, knowledge, controllability), (ii) the 
benefits that each hazard provides to society, (iii) 
the number of deaths caused by the hazard in an 
average year, (iv) the number of deaths caused by the 
hazard in a disastrous year, and (v) the seriousness 
of each death from a particular hazard relative to a 
death due to other causes.
Numerous studies carried out within the psycho-
metric paradigm have shown that perceived risk is 
quantifiable and predictable. Psychometric techni-
ques seem well suited for identifying similarities 
and differences among groups with regard to risk 
perceptions and attitudes (see Table 2). They have 
also shown that the concept “risk” means different 
things to different people. When experts judge risk, 
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their responses correlate highly with technical es-
timates of annual fatalities. Lay people can assess 
annual fatalities if they are asked to (and produce 
estimates somewhat like the technical estimates). 
However, their judgments of risk are related more to 
other hazard characteristics (for example, catastro-
phic potential, threat to future generations) and, as 
a result, tend to differ from their own (and experts’) 
estimates of annual fatalities.
Table 2 - Ordering of perceived risks for 30 activities 
and technologies. The ordering is based on the geo-
metric mean risk ratings within each group. Rank 1 
represents the most risky activity or technology.
Rank Order
1977 Laypersons                                                                  Experts               
1 Nuclear power 20
2 Motor vehicles 1
3 Handguns 4
4 Smoking 2
17 Electric power (non-nuclear) 9
22 X-rays 7
30 Vaccinations 25
Various models have been advanced to represent 
the relationships between perceptions, behavior, 
and these qualitative characteristics of hazards. 
As we shall see, the picture that emerges from this 
work is both orderly and complex.
Factor-analytic representations. Psychometric 
studies have demonstrated that every hazard has a 
unique pattern of qualities that appears to be related 
to its perceived risk. Figure 1 shows the mean profi-
les across nine characteristic qualities of risk that 
emerged for nuclear power and medical x-rays in an 
early study (Fischhoff et al., 1978). Nuclear power 
was judged to have much higher risk than x-rays 
and to need much greater reduction in risk before it 
Figure 1 - Qualitative characteristics of perceived risk 
for nuclear power and X-rays across nine risk charac-
teristics
would become “safe enough.” As the figure illustra-
tes, nuclear power also had a much more negative 
profile across the various risk characteristics.
Many of the qualitative risk characteristics that 
make up a hazard’s profile tend to be highly correlated 
with each other, across a wide range of hazards. For 
example, hazards rated as “voluntary” tend also to 
be rated as “controllable” and “well-known;” hazards 
that appeared to threaten future generations tend 
also to be seen as having catastrophic potential, and 
so on. Investigation of these interrelationships by me-
ans of factor analysis has indicated that the broader 
domain of characteristics can be condensed to a small 
set of higher-order characteristics or factors.
The factor space presented in Figure 2 has been 
replicated across groups of lay people and experts 
judging large and diverse sets of hazards. Factor 
1, labeled “dread risk,” is defined at its high (right 
hand) end of perceived lack of control, dread, catas-
trophic potential, fatal consequences, and the ine-
quitable distribution of risks and benefits. Nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power score highest on the 
characteristics that make up this factor. Factor 2, 
labeled “unknown risk,” is defined at its high end by 
hazards judged to be unobservable, unknown, new, 
and delayed in their manifestation of harm. Chemi-
cal and DNA technologies score particularly high 
on this factor. A third factor, reflecting the number 
of people exposed to the risk, has been obtained in 
several studies.
Research has shown that laypeople’s risk percep-
tions and attitudes are closely related to the position 
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Figure 2 - Location of 81 hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships among 15 risk characte-
ristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics, as indicated by the lower diagram. Source: 
Slovic et al. (1985)
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of a hazard within the factor space. Most important 
is the factor “Dread Risk.” The higher a hazard’s 
score on this factor (i.e., the further to the right it 
appears in the space), the higher its perceived risk, 
the more people want to see its current risks redu-
ced, and the more they want to see strict regulation 
employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk. In 
contrast, experts’ perceptions of risk are not closely 
related to any of the various risk characteristics or 
factors derived from these characteristics. Instead, 
experts appear to see riskiness as synonymous with 
expected annual mortality (Slovic et al., 1979). As a 
result, many conflicts about risk may result from 
experts and laypeople having different definitions 
of the concept.
Perceptions Have Impacts: the social amplification 
of risk
Perceptions of risk play a key role in a process 
labeled social amplification of risk (Kasperson et 
al., 1988). Social amplification is triggered by the 
occurrence of an adverse event, which could be a 
major or minor accident, a discovery of pollution, 
an outbreak of disease, an incident of sabotage, 
and so on. Risk amplification reflects the fact that 
the adverse impacts of such an event sometimes 
extend far beyond the direct damages to victims and 
property and may result in massive indirect impacts 
such as litigation against a company or loss of sales, 
increased regulation of an industry, and so on. In 
some cases, all companies within an industry are 
affected, regardless of which company was respon-
sible for the mishap. Thus, the event can be thought 
of as a stone dropped in a pond. The ripples spread 
outward, encompassing first the directly affected 
victims, then the responsible company or agency, 
and, in the extreme, reaching other companies, 
agencies, or industries (See Figure 3). Examples of 
events resulting in extreme higher-order impacts 
include the chemical manufacturing accident at 
Bhopal, India, the disastrous launch of the space 
shuttle Challenger, the nuclear-reactor accidents 
at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the adverse 
effects of the drug Thalidomide, the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill, the adulteration of Tylenol capsules with 
cyanide, and, most recently, the deaths of several 
individuals from anthrax. An important feature of 
social amplification is that the direct impacts need 
not be too large to trigger major indirect impacts. 
The seven deaths due to the Tylenol tampering resul-
ted in more than 125,000 stories in the print media 
alone and inflicted losses of more than one billion 
dollars upon the Johnson & Johnson Company, due to 
the damaged image of the product (Mitchell, 1989). 
The cost of dealing with the anthrax threat will be 
far greater than this.
Figure 3 - A model of impact for unfortunate events
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It appears likely that multiple mechanisms 
contribute to the social amplification of risk. First, 
extensive media coverage of an event can contribu-
te to heightened perceptions of risk and amplified 
impacts (Burns et al., 1990). Second, a particular 
hazard or mishap may enter into the agenda of social 
groups, or what Mazur (1981) terms the partisans, 
within the community or nation. The attack on the 
apple growth-regulator “Alar” by the Natural Resour-
ces Defense Council demonstrates the important 
impacts that special-interest groups can trigger 
(Moore, 1989).
A third mechanism of amplification arises out of 
the interpretation of unfortunate events as clues or 
signals regarding the magnitude of the risk and the 
adequacy of the risk-management process (Burns 
et al., 1990; Slovic, 1987). The informativeness or 
signal potential of a mishap, and thus its potential 
social impact, appears to be systematically related 
to the perceived characteristics of the hazard. An ac-
cident that takes many lives may produce relatively 
little social disturbance (beyond that caused to the 
victims’ families and friends) if it occurs as part of 
a familiar and well-understood system (e.g., a train 
wreck). However, a small incident in an unfamiliar 
system (or one perceived as poorly understood), such 
as a nuclear waste repository or a recombinant DNA 
laboratory, may have immense social consequences 
if it is perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly 
catastrophic mishaps.
One implication of the signal concept is that effort 
and expense beyond that indicated by a cost-benefit 
analysis might be warranted to reduce the possibility 
of “high-signal events.” Unfortunate events invol-
ving hazards in the upper right quadrant of Figure 
2 appear particularly likely to have the potential to 
produce large ripples. As a result, risk analyses in-
volving these hazards need to be made sensitive to 
these possible higher order impacts. Doing so would 
likely bring greater protection to potential victims 
as well as to companies and industries.
Sex, Politics, and Emotion in Risk 
Judgments
Given the complex and subjective nature of risk, it 
should not surprise us that many interesting and 
provocative things occur when people judge risks. 
Recent studies have shown that factors such as gen-
der, race, political worldviews, affiliation, emotional 
affect, and trust are strongly correlated with risk 
judgments. Equally important is that these factors 
influence the judgments of experts as well as the 
judgments of laypersons.
Sex
Sex is strongly related to risk judgments and at-
titudes. Several dozen studies have documented 
the finding that men tend to judge risks as smaller 
and less problematic than do women. A number of 
hypotheses have been put forward to explain these 
differences in risk perception. One approach has 
been to focus on biological and social factors. For 
example, women have been characterized as more 
concerned about human health and safety because 
they give birth and are socialized to nurture and 
maintain life (Steger and Witt, 1989). They have 
been characterized as physically more vulnerable 
to violence, such as rape, for example, and this may 
sensitize them to other risks (Baumer, 1978; Riger 
et al., 1978). The combination of biology and social 
experience has been put forward as the source of a 
“different voice” that is distinct to women (Gilligan, 
1982; Merchant, 1980).
A lack of knowledge and familiarity with science 
and technology has also been suggested as a basis 
for these differences, particularly with regard to 
nuclear and chemical hazards. Women are discou-
raged from studying science and there are relatively 
few women scientists and engineers (Alper, 1993). 
However, Barke et al., (1997) have found that female 
physical scientists judge risks from nuclear techno-
logies to be higher than do male physical scientists. 
Similar results with scientists were obtained by 
Slovic et al., (1997) who found that female members 
of the British Toxicological Society were far more 
likely than male toxicologists to judge societal risks 
as moderate or high. Certainly the female scientists 
in these studies cannot be accused of lacking kno-
wledge and technological literacy. Something else 
must be going on.
Hints about the origin of these sex differences 
come from a study by Flynn et al., (1994) in which 
1,512 Americans were asked, for each of 25 hazard 
items, to indicate whether the hazard posed (1) little 
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or no risk, (2) slight risk, (3) moderate risk, or (4) 
high risk to society. The percentage of “high-risk” 
responses was greater for women on every item. 
Perhaps the most striking result from this study 
is shown in Figure 4, which presents the mean risk 
ratings separately for White males, White females, 
non-White males, and non-White females. Across the 
25 hazards, White males produced risk-perception 
ratings that were consistently much lower than the 
means of the other three groups.
What differentiated these White males who were 
most responsible for the effect from the rest of the 
sample, including other White males who judged 
risks as relatively high? When compared to the 
remainder of the sample, the group of White males 
with the lowest risk-perception scores were better 
educated (42.7% college or postgraduate degree vs. 
26.3% in the other group), had higher household 
incomes (32.1% above $50,000 vs. 21.0%), and were 
politically more conservative (48.0% conservative 
vs. 33.2%).
Particularly noteworthy is the finding that the 
low risk-perception subgroup of White males also 
held very different attitudes from the other respon-
dents. Specifically, they were more likely than the 
others to:
• Agree that future generations can take care of the-
mselves when facing risks imposed on them from 
today’s technologies (64.2% vs. 46.9%).
• Agree that if a risk is very small it is okay for socie-
ty to impose that risk on individuals without their 
consent (31.7% vs. 20.8%).
• Agree that science can settle differences of opinion 
about the risks of nuclear power (61.8% vs. 50.4%).
• Agree that government and industry can be trusted 
with making the proper decisions to manage the 
risks from technology (48.0% vs. 31.1 %).
• Agree that we can trust the experts and engineers 
who build, operate, and regulate nuclear power 
plants (62.6% vs. 39.7%).
• Agree that we have gone too far in pushing equal 
rights in this country (42.7% vs. 30.9%).
• Agree with the use of capital punishment (88.2% 
vs. 70.5%).
• Disagree that technological development is des-
troying nature (56.9% vs. 32.8%).
• Disagree that they have very little control over risks 
to their health (73.6% vs. 63.1%).
• Disagree that the world needs a more equal distri-
bution of wealth (42.7% vs. 31.3%).
• Disagree that local residents should have the au-
thority to close a nuclear power plant if they think 
it is not run properly (50.4% vs. 25.1%).
• Disagree that the public should vote to decide on 
issues such as nuclear power (28.5% vs. 16.7%).
Figure 4 - Mean risk-perception ratings by race and 
gender. Source: Flynn et al. (1994)
Although perceived risk was inversely related to 
income and educational level, controlling for these 
differences statistically did not reduce much of the 
White-male effect on risk perception.
When the data underlying Figure 4 were exami-
ned more closely, Flynn et al. observed that not all 
White males perceived risks as low. The “White-male 
effect” appeared to be caused by about 30% of the 
White-male sample who judged risks to be extreme-
ly low. The remaining White males were not much 
different from the other subgroups with regard to 
perceived risk.
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In sum, the subgroup of White males who per-
ceive risks to be quite low can be characterized by 
trust in institutions and authorities and by anti-ega-
litarian attitudes, including a disinclination toward 
giving decision-making power to citizens in areas 
of risk management.
The results of this study raise new questions. 
What does it mean for the explanations of gender 
differences when we see that the sizable differences 
between White males and White females do not 
exist for non-White males and non-White females? 
Why do a substantial percentage of White males 
see the world as so much less risky than everyone 
else sees it?
Obviously, the salience of biology is reduced by 
these data on risk perception and race. Biological 
factors should apply to non-White men and women 
as well as to White men and women. The present 
data thus move us away from biology and toward 
sociopolitical explanations. Perhaps White males 
see less risk in the world because they create, ma-
nage, control, and benefit from many of the major 
technologies and activities. Perhaps women and 
non-White men see the world as more dangerous 
because in many ways they are more vulnerable, be-
cause they benefit less from many of its technologies 
and institutions, and because they have less power 
and control over what happens in their communities 
and their lives. Although the survey conducted by 
Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz was not designed to test 
these alternative explanations, the race and gen-
der differences in perceptions and attitudes point 
toward the role of power, status, alienation, trust, 
perceived government responsiveness, and other 
sociopolitical factors in determining perception and 
acceptance of risk.
To the extent that these sociopolitical factors 
shape public perception of risks, we can see why 
traditional attempts to make people see the world as 
White males do, by showing them statistics and risk 
assessments, are often unsuccessful. The problem of 
risk conflict and controversy goes beyond science. 
It is deeply rooted in the social and political fabric 
of our society.
Risk Perception, Emotion, and Affect
The studies described in the preceding section illus-
trate the role of worldviews as orienting mechanisms. 
Research suggests that emotion is also an orienting 
mechanism that directs fundamental psychological 
processes such as attention, memory, and informa-
tion processing. Emotion and worldviews may thus 
be functionally similar in that both may help us 
navigate quickly and efficiently through a complex, 
uncertain, and sometimes dangerous world.
The discussion in this section is concerned with 
a subtle form of emotion called affect, defined as a 
positive (like) or negative (dislike) evaluative feeling 
toward an external stimulus (e.g., some hazard such 
as cigarette smoking). Such evaluations occur rap-
idly and automatically—note how quickly you sense a 
negative affective feeling toward the stimulus word 
“hate” or the word “cancer.”
Support for the conception of affect as an orient-
ing mechanism comes from a study by Alhakami 
and Slovic (1994). They observed that, whereas the 
risks and benefits to society from various activities 
and technologies (e.g., nuclear power, commercial 
aviation) tend to be positively associated in the 
world, they are inversely correlated in people’s minds 
(higher perceived benefit is associated with lower 
perceived risk; lower perceived benefit is associated 
with higher perceived risk). Alhakami and Slovic 
found that this inverse relationship was linked to 
people’s reliance on general affective evaluations 
when making risk/benefit judgments. When the 
affective evaluation was favorable (as with auto-
mobiles, for example), the activity or technology 
being judged was seen as having high benefit and 
low risk; when the evaluation was unfavorable (e.g., 
as with pesticides), risks tended to be seen as high 
and benefits as low. It thus appears that the affective 
response is primary, and the risk and benefit judg-
ments are derived (at least partly) from it.
Finucane et al. (2000) investigated the inverse 
relationship between risk and benefit judgments 
under a time-pressure condition designed to limit 
the use of analytic thought and enhance the reliance 
on affect. As expected, the inverse relationship was 
strengthened when time pressure was introduced. 
A second study tested and confirmed the hypothesis 
that providing information designed to alter the 
favorability of one’s overall affective evaluation of 
an item (say nuclear power) would systematically 
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change the risk and benefit judgments for that item. 
For example, providing information calling people’s 
attention to the benefits provided by nuclear power 
(as a source of energy) depressed people’s percep-
tion of the risks of that technology. The same sort 
of reduction in perceived risk occurred for food pre-
servatives and natural gas, when information about 
their benefits was provided. Information about risk 
was also found to alter perception of benefit. A model 
depicting how reliance upon affect can lead to these 
observed changes in perception of risk and benefit 
is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5 - Model showing how information about benefit (A) or information about risk (B) could increase the 
positive affective evaluation of nuclear power and lead to inferences about risk and benefit that coincides 
affectively with the information given. Similarly, information could make the overall affective evaluation of 
nuclear power more negative as in C and D, resulting in inferences about risk and benefit that are consistent 
with this more negative feeling. Source: Finucane et al. (2000)
Slovic et al. (1991a, b) studied the relationship 
between affect and perceived risk for hazards re-
lated to nuclear power. For example, Slovic, Flynn, 
and Layman asked respondents “What is the first 
thought or image that comes to mind when you 
hear the phrase ‘nuclear waste repository?”‘ After 
providing up to three associations to the repository 
stimulus, each respondent rated the affective quality 
of these associations on a five-point scale, ranging 
from extremely negative to extremely positive.
Although most of the images that people evoke 
when asked to think about nuclear power or nuclear 
waste are affectively negative (e.g., death, destruc-
tion, war, catastrophe), some are positive (e.g., 
abundant electricity and the benefits it brings). The 
affective values of these positive and negative im-
ages appear to sum in a way that is predictive of our 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. If the balance 
is positive, we respond favorably; if it is negative, 
we respond unfavorably. For example, the affective 
quality of a person’s associations to a nuclear waste 
repository was found to be related to whether the 
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person would vote for or against a referendum on 
a nuclear waste repository and to their judgments 
regarding the risk of a repository accident. Specifi-
cally, more than 90% of those people whose first im-
age was judged very negative said that they would 
vote against a repository in Nevada; fewer than 
50% of those people whose first image was positive 
said they would vote against the repository (Slovic 
et al., 1991a).
Using data from the national survey of 1,500 
Americans described earlier, Peters and Slovic (1996) 
found that the affective ratings of associations to the 
stimulus “nuclear power” were highly predictive of 
responses to the question: “If your community was 
faced with a shortage of electricity, do you agree or 
disagree that a new nuclear power plant should be 
built to supply that electricity?” Among the 25% of 
respondents with the most positive associations to 
nuclear power, 69% agreed to building a new plant. 
Among the 25% of respondents with the most negative 
associations, only 13% agreed.
The Importance of Trust
The research described above has painted a portrait 
of risk perception influenced by the interplay of 
psychological, social, and political factors. Members 
of the public and experts can disagree about risk 
because they define risk differently, have different 
worldviews, different affective experiences and reac-
tions, or different social status. Another reason why 
the public often rejects scientists’ risk assessments 
is lack of trust. Trust in risk management, like risk 
perception, has been found to correlate with gender, 
race, worldviews, and affect.
Social relationships of all types, including risk 
management, rely heavily on trust. Indeed, much 
of the contentiousness that has been observed in 
the risk-management arena has been attributed 
to a climate of distrust that exists between the pu-
blic, industry, and risk-management professionals 
(e.g., Slovic, 1993; Slovic et al., 1991a). The limited 
effectiveness of risk-communication efforts can be 
attributed to the lack of trust. If you trust the risk 
manager, communication is relatively easy. If trust 
is lacking, no form or process of communication will 
be satisfactory (Fessenden-Raden et al., 1987).
How Trust Is Created and Destroyed
One of the most fundamental qualities of trust has 
been known for ages. Trust is fragile. It is typically 
created rather slowly, but it can be destroyed in an 
instant—by a single mishap or mistake. Thus, once 
trust is lost, it may take a long time to rebuild it to 
its former state. In some instances, lost trust may 
never be regained. Abraham Lincoln understood 
this quality. In a letter to Alexander McClure, he 
observed: “If you once forfeit the confidence of your 
fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect 
and esteem” [italics added].
The fact that trust is easier to destroy than to 
create reflects certain fundamental mechanisms 
of human psychology called here “the asymmetry 
principle.” When it comes to winning trust, the 
playing field is not level. It is tilted toward distrust, 
for each of the following reasons:
1. Negative (trust-destroying) events are more visible 
or noticeable than positive (trust-building) events. 
Negative events often take the form of specific, well-
defined incidents such as accidents, lies, discoveries 
of errors, or other mismanagement. Positive events, 
while sometimes visible, more often are fuzzy or 
indistinct. For example, how many positive events 
are represented by the safe operation of a nuclear 
power plant for one day? Is this one event? Dozens 
of events? Hundreds? There is no precise answer. 
When events are invisible or poorly defined, they 
carry little or no weight in shaping our attitudes 
and opinions.
2. When events are well-defined and do come to our at-
tention, negative (trust-destroying) events carry much 
greater weight than positive events (Slovic, 1993).
3. Adding fuel to the fire of asymmetry is yet ano-
ther idiosyncrasy of human psychology—sources of 
bad (trust-destroying) news tend to be seen as more 
credible than sources of good news. The findings 
reported in Section 3.4 regarding “intuitive toxico-
logy” illustrate this point. In general, confidence 
in the validity of animal studies is not particularly 
high. However, when told that a study has found that 
a chemical is carcinogenic in animals, members of 
the public express considerable confidence in the 
validity of this study for predicting health effects 
in humans.2
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4. Another important psychological tendency is 
that distrust, once initiated, tends to reinforce and 
perpetuate distrust. Distrust tends to inhibit the 
kinds of personal contacts and experiences that are 
necessary to overcome distrust. By avoiding others 
whose motives or actions we distrust, we never get to 
see that these people are competent, well-meaning, 
and trustworthy.
“The System Destroys Trust”
Thus far we have been discussing the psychological 
tendencies that create and reinforce distrust in 
situations of risk. Appreciation of those psycholo-
gical principles leads us toward a new perspective 
on risk perception, trust, and conflict. Conflicts 
and controversies surrounding risk management 
are not due to public irrationality or ignorance but, 
instead, can be seen as expected side effects of these 
psychological tendencies, interacting with a highly 
participatory democratic system of government and 
amplified by certain powerful technological and 
social changes in society. Technological change has 
given the electronic and print media the capability 
(effectively utilized) of informing us of news from all 
over the world—often right as it happens. Moreover, 
just as individuals give greater weight and attention 
to negative events, so do the news media. Much of 
what the media reports is bad (trust-destroying) 
news (Lichtenberg and MacLean, 1992).
A second important change, a social phenome-
non, is the rise of powerful special interest groups, 
well-funded (by a fearful public) and sophisticated 
in using their own experts and the media to com-
municate their concerns and their distrust to the 
public to influence risk policy debates and decisions 
(Fenton, 1989). The social problem is compounded 
by the fact that we tend to manage our risks within 
an adversarial legal system that pits expert against 
expert, contradicting each other’s risk assessments 
and further destroying the public trust.
The young science of risk assessment is too fragi-
le, too indirect, to prevail in such a hostile atmosphe-
re. Scientific analysis of risks cannot allay our fears 
of low-probability catastrophes or delayed cancers 
unless we trust the system. In the absence of trust, 
science (and risk assessment) can only feed public 
concerns, by uncovering more bad news. A single 
study demonstrating an association between ex-
posure to chemicals or radiation and some adverse 
health effect cannot easily be offset by numerous 
studies failing to find such an association. Thus, 
for example, the more studies that are conducted 
looking for effects of electric and magnetic fields or 
other difficult-to-evaluate hazards, the more likely it 
is that these studies will increase public concerns, 
even if the majority of these studies fail to find any 
association with ill health (MacGregor et al., 1994; 
Morgan et al., 1985). In short, because evidence for 
lack of risk often carries little weight, risk-assess-
ment studies tend to increase perceived risk.
Resolving Risk Conflicts: where do 
we go from here?
The psychometric paradigm has been employed in-
ternationally. One such international study by Slovic 
et al. (2000) helps frame two different solutions 
to resolving risk conflicts. This study compared 
public views of nuclear power in the United States, 
where this technology is resisted, and France, whe-
re nuclear energy appears to be embraced (France 
obtains about 80% of its electricity from nuclear 
power). Researchers found, to their surprise, that 
concerns about the risks from nuclear power and 
nuclear waste were high in France and were at least 
as great there as in the U.S. Thus, perception of risk 
could not account for the different level of reliance 
on nuclear energy in the two countries. Further 
analysis of the survey data uncovered a number of 
differences that might be important in explaining 
the difference between France and the U.S. Specifi-
cally, the French:
• saw greater need for nuclear power and greater 
economic benefit from it;
• had greater trust in scientists, industry, and go-
vernment officials who design, build, operate, and 
regulate nuclear power plants;
• were more likely to believe that decision-making 
authority should reside with the experts and gover-
nment authorities, rather than with the people.
These findings point to some important differen-
ces between the workings of democracy in the U.S. 
and France and the effects of different “democratic 
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models” on acceptance of risks. One such model 
relies primarily on technical solutions to resolving 
risk conflicts; the other looks to process-oriented 
solutions.
Technical Solutions to Risk Conflicts
There has been no shortage of high-level attention 
given to the risk conflicts described above. One 
prominent proposal by Justice Stephen Breyer (1993) 
attempts to break what he sees as a vicious circle 
of public perception, congressional overreaction, 
and conservative regulation that leads to obsessive 
and costly preoccupation with reducing negligible 
risks as well as to inconsistent standards among 
health and safety programs. Breyer sees public mis-
perceptions of risk and low levels of mathematical 
understanding at the core of excessive regulatory 
response. His proposed solution is to create a small 
centralized administrative group charged with cre-
ating uniformity and rationality in highly technical 
areas of risk management. This group would be sta-
ffed by civil servants with experience in health and 
environmental agencies, Congress, and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). A parallel is dra-
wn between this group and the prestigious Conseil 
d’Etat in France.
Similar frustration with the costs of meeting 
public demands led the 104th Congress to introduce 
numerous bills designed to require all major new 
regulations to be justified by extensive risk asses-
sments. Proponents of this legislation argued that 
such measures are necessary to ensure that regula-
tions are based on “sound science’’ and effectively 
reduce significant risks at reasonable costs.
The language of this proposed legislation reflects 
the traditional narrow view of risk and risk asses-
sment based “only on the best reasonably available 
scientific data and scientific understanding.” Agen-
cies are further directed to develop a systematic 
program for external peer review using “expert 
bodies” or “other devices comprised of participants 
selected on the basis of their expertise relevant to 
the sciences involved” (United States, 1995, pp. 57-
58). Public participation in this process is advocated, 
but no mechanisms for this are specified.
The proposals by Breyer and the 104th Congress 
are typical in their call for more and better tech-
nical analysis and expert oversight to rationalize 
risk management. There is no doubt that technical 
analysis is vital for making risk decisions better 
informed, more consistent, and more accountable. 
However, value conflicts and pervasive distrust in 
risk management cannot easily be reduced by tech-
nical analysis. Trying to address risk controversies 
primarily with more science is, in fact, likely to 
exacerbate conflict.
Process-Oriented Solutions
A major objective of this paper has been to demons-
trate the complexity of risk and its assessment. To 
summarize the earlier discussions, danger is real, 
but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment 
is inherently subjective and represents a blending 
of science and judgment with important psycholo-
gical, social, cultural, and political factors. Finally, 
our social and democratic institutions, remarkable 
as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the 
risk arena.
Whoever controls the definition of risk controls 
the rational solution to the problem at hand. If you 
define risk one way, then one option will rise to the 
top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the 
best. If you define it another way, perhaps incorpora-
ting qualitative characteristics and other contextual 
factors, you will likely get a different ordering of 
your action solutions (Fischhoff et al., 1984). Defi-
ning risk is thus an exercise in power.
Scientific literacy and public education are 
important, but they are not central to risk contro-
versies. The public is not irrational. The public is 
influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is 
both simple and sophisticated. So are scientists. The 
public is influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and 
values. So are scientists, particularly when they are 
working at the limits of their expertise.
The limitations of risk science, the importance 
and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the subjec-
tive and contextual nature of the risk game point 
to the need for a new approach—one that focuses 
on introducing more public participation into both 
risk assessment and risk decision making to make 
the decision process more democratic, improve the 
relevance and quality of technical analysis, and 
increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of 
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the resulting decisions. Work by scholars and prac-
titioners in Europe and North America has begun to 
lay the foundations for improved methods of public 
participation within deliberative decision proces-
ses that include negotiation, mediation, oversight 
committees, and other forms of public involvement 
(English, 1992; Kunreuther et al., 1993; National 
Research Council, 1996; Renn et al., 1991, 1995).
Recognizing interested and affected citizens as 
legitimate partners in the exercise of risk asses-
sment is no short-term panacea for the problems 
of risk management. It won’t be easy and it isn’t 
guaranteed. But serious attention to participation 
and process issues may, in the long run, lead to more 
satisfying and successful ways to manage risk.
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